













































































































































































































































































































































100	values	of	each	index	were	averaged	for	each	single	observation).	E = 15,	J = 6,	N = 200,	m = 10,	employer	aspiration
levels	were	taken	from	a	random	uniform	distribution.
Discussion
4.1 	Partner	selection	does	not	work	efficiently	in	various	social	contexts.	As	search	theory	has
demonstrated,	in	case	of	asymmetric	information,	maximizing	principles	(looking	for	the	best	options)	do
not	lead	to	higher	profit,	while	higher	utility	is	achieved	when	the	search	stops	at	the	first	option	that	is
within	the	reservation	price.	We	constructed	a	simple	model	of	two-sided	matching	and	demonstrated
that	in	addition	to	mismatch,	discrimination	emerges	as	an	unintended	and	un-institutionalized	process,
simply	as	a	result	of	selection	decisions	that	are	based	on	experience.	This	implies	that	in	case	of
asymmetric	information,	optimal	matching	and	equality	in	employment	is	hard	to	achieve,	even	if
opportunities	are	not	biased	in	any	sense.	In	our	study,	we	modeled	hiring	in	labor	markets	and	showed
that	perfectly	neutral	employers	widely	discriminated	between	groups.	No	true	statistical	difference
between	individual	types	was	necessary	to	generate	discrimination.	We	showed	that,	even	with	fair
employers,	individual	discrimination	was	extreme	and	caused	inequality	at	the	aggregate	level.
4.2 	Our	simulations	show	that	inequality	can	be	the	unintended	consequence	of	a	neutral	hiring	process,
similar	to	other	judgment	bias	during	repeated	sampling	(cf.	Simon	1955,	1956;	Denrell	2005;	Fiedler	&
Juslin	2006;	Denrell	&	Le	Mens	2007;	Le	Mens	&	Denrell	2011).	Hence,	statistical	differences	and	built-
in	preferences	and	prejudices	cannot	be	considered	as	the	only	mechanisms	responsible	for	inequality
in	the	employment	rates	of	different	groups.	This	contrasts	with	the	economists'	view	that	discrimination
should	not	persist	if	beliefs	were	incorrect	as	employers	not	sharing	false	beliefs	would	gain	a
competitive	advantage	(Arrow	1973;	Aigner	&	Cain	1977).	Indeed,	there	is	poor	empirical	evidence	that
employer	practices	reflect	any	efficient	and	rational	response	to	differences	in	skills	and	turnover	costs
(Bielby	&	Baron	1986).
4.3 	It	is	worth	noting	that	this	was	possible	as	in	our	model	we	intentionally	excluded	other	empirically
relevant	factors	and	mechanisms,	such	as	referral	hiring	(Fernandez	et	al.	2000;	Fernandez	&
Fernandez-Mateo	2006;	Stovel	&	Fountain	2009;	Fountain	&	Stovel	2014),	on-the-job	search	(Richiardi
2004,	Richiardi	2006);	market	evolution	(Ballot	2002;	Neugart	2004;	Fagiolo	et	al.	2004),	and
endogenous	policy	(Neugart	2004,	Neugart	2008).	Our	results	show	that	discrimination	is	prevalent	even
without	these	auxiliary	assumptions,	which	would	likely	to	lead	to	even	higher	inequality.
4.4 	Secondly,	we	showed	that	discrimination	was	intensified	when	employers	had	high	aspirations.
Employers'	high	aspirations	are	typical	for	high-status,	high-wage	jobs.	Our	results	indicate	that	when
available	expertise	is	limited,	high	aspirations	do	not	pay	off	and	lead	to	more	judgment	partiality.	This
result	confirms	the	"paradox	of	meritocracy";	according	to	which	organizations	with	meritocratic
evaluation	may	ironically	show	greater	bias,	for	instance,	in	favor	of	men	over	equally	performing
women	(Castilla	&	Benard	2010).	Third,	our	model	confirmed	conventional	wisdom:	in	the	simulation
scenarios	where	worker	quality	and	ambition	were	independently	set,	the	most	ambitious	workers
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achieved	the	highest	quality	jobs.	Even	if	worker	quality	and	ambition	were	negatively	correlated,
ambitious	workers	ended	up	in	better	jobs.
4.5 	Finally,	note	that	worker	ambitions	were	not	updated	during	our	simulations.	Endogenous	ambition
updates	are	important	both	theoretically	and	empirically	in	reinforcement	learning	and	various	social
interactions	(see	e.g.,	Diekmann	&	Preisendörfer	1998;	Macy	&	Flache	2002;	Bendor,	Diermeier	&	Ting
2003;	Izquierdo,	Gotts	&Polhill	2004;	Matsen	and	Nowak	2004).	In	future	model	extensions,	we	could
explore	the	macro	implications	of	different	variants	of	endogenous	ambitions,	reinforcement	learning
and	strategic	matching	on	labor	market	dynamics.
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Notes
	1Our	agent-based	model	was	built	in	NetLogo	(Wilensky	1999).	We	re-implemented	the	model	in
Repast	in	order	to	check	its	internal	validity.	Both	versions	are	available	at	the	CoMSES	Net	(Network
for	Computational	Modeling	in	the	Social	and	Ecological	Sciences):
https://www.openabm.org/model/4379/version/2/view.
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